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The Components of Face Processing and Their 
Functional Independence
A common conception of face perception is that its 
different component processes are to some extent func-
tionally independent of each other (see, e.g., Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Ellis, 1989; Young, 1998). There is plenty 
of evidence for this view, from dissociations following 
brain injury (see, e.g., Campbell, Landis, & Regard, 1986; 
Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993; Parry, Young, 
Saul, & Moss, 1991; Young, Newcombe, de Haan, Small, 
& Hay, 1993) to the results of speeded judgment tasks 
in normal participants (see, e.g., Bruce, Ellis, Gibling, 
& Young, 1987; Campbell, Brooks, de Haan, & Roberts, 
1996; Young, McWeeny, Hay, & Ellis, 1986). Evidence 
from neurophysiological studies of nonhuman primates 
and functional brain-imaging studies in humans indicates 
that this functional separation is underpinned by anatomi-
cally separable components of a distributed face-processing 
system (see, e.g., Hasselmo, Rolls, & Baylis, 1989; Puce, 
Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998; see Haxby, 
Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000, for a review).
Although our appearances change gradually over the 
years, facial identity is invariant relative to the rapid 
changes that occur in our faces when we speak or emote. 
In their model of face perception, Bruce and Young (1986) 
proposed that, subsequent to an initial common stage of 
structural processing, distinct sets of processes are in-
volved in recognizing different aspects of faces, includ-
ing identity, emotion, and speech. More recently, Haxby 
et al. (2000) have proposed a model of face processing 
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Previous research with speeded-response interference tasks modeled on the Garner paradigm has 
demonstrated that task-irrelevant variations in either emotional expression or facial speech do not 
interfere with identity judgments, but irrelevant variations in identity do interfere with expression and 
facial speech judgments. Sex, like identity, is a relatively invariant aspect of faces. Drawing on a recent 
model of face processing according to which invariant and changeable aspects of faces are represented 
in separate neurological systems, we predicted asymmetric interference between sex and emotion 
classification. The results of Experiment 1, in which the Garner paradigm was employed, confirmed 
this prediction: Emotion classifications were influenced by the sex of the faces, but sex classifications 
remained relatively unaffected by facial expression. A second experiment, in which the difficulty of 
the tasks was equated, corroborated these findings, indicating that differences in processing speed 
cannot account for the asymmetric relationship between facial emotion and sex processing. A third 
experiment revealed the same pattern of asymmetric interference through the use of a variant of the 
Simon paradigm. To the extent that Garner interference and Simon interference indicate interactions 
at perceptual and response-selection stages of processing, respectively, a challenge for face process-
ing models is to show how the same asymmetric pattern of interference could occur at these different 
stages. The implications of these findings for the functional independence of the different components 
of face processing are discussed.
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that shares some elements of Bruce and Young’s model 
but fits the various components of face processing into 
two broadly defined streams. On the basis of neuroimag-
ing and electrophysiological research, Haxby et al. pro-
posed one route, leading from inferior occipital cortex 
to inferotemporal cortex, in which relatively invariant 
aspects of faces are represented, and another route, lead-
ing from inferior occipital cortex to superior temporal 
cortex, in which changeable aspects of faces resulting 
from movement of the facial features are represented. (In 
this article, we shall use the general term expressions as 
shorthand for the changes in the shapes of facial features 
created by muscle movements involved in talking and 
emoting.) These two processing streams are regarded as 
being largely functionally independent of each other, al-
though Haxby et al.’s account of the model does allow for 
a modicum of interaction. Furthermore, the model posits 
that specific face perception functions are performed by 
the coordinated interaction of each of these two streams 
with other neural regions. For example, the perception of 
facial emotion involves the occipital to superior temporal 
stream operating in concert with regions involved in rep-
resenting emotional information, such as the amygdala 
and the insula, whereas the perception of identity involves 
the occipital to inferotemporal stream operating in con-
cert with more anterior temporal regions.
Face Processing Interference With the Garner 
Paradigm
The results of some studies in which a speeded-judgment 
interference task was employed have been interpreted as 
indicating that certain components of face processing can 
interact and so are not completely independent. Using the 
Garner paradigm (Garner, 1976), Schweinberger and col-
leagues found that facial identity judgments remain unaf-
fected by task-irrelevant variations in either facial expres-
sion or facial speech, yet variations in facial identity did 
influence judgments about facial expression and facial 
speech (Schweinberger, Burton, & Kelly, 1999; Schwein-
berger & Soukup, 1998; see also Baudouin, Martin, Ti-
berghien, Verlut, & Franck, 2002).
In the Garner paradigm, participants are required to 
classify exemplars of a stimulus, such as a face, along a 
particular dimension while a second, task-irrelevant di-
mension of the stimulus is varied. The stimuli are presented 
in three different conditions, defined by the relationship 
between the task-relevant and task-irrelevant dimensions. 
In the control condition, the irrelevant dimension is held 
constant across variations in the relevant dimension. For 
example, all faces might express the same emotion when 
the task is to judge identity, and all faces might be of the 
same person when the task is to judge facial expression. 
In the orthogonal condition, both the irrelevant and rel-
evant dimensions are varied (e.g., two people express each 
of two different emotions). In the correlated condition, 
changes in the irrelevant dimension covary with changes 
in the relevant dimension (e.g., Person A always expresses 
fear and Person B always expresses happiness). The logic 
of the Garner paradigm is that a difference in response 
times (RTs) to the stimuli across these three conditions is 
evidence that the processing of the different stimulus di-
mensions is not independent; in other words, it is evidence 
that participants are unable to pay selective attention to 
one dimension without the other dimension’s influencing 
their responses. The strongest evidence of independence 
is longer RTs in the orthogonal than in the control condi-
tion. Shorter RTs in the correlated condition than in the 
control condition, indicating facilitation of classification 
(“redundancy gain”), are consistent with but not strongly 
indicative of nonindependent or integral processing (for 
discussion, see Eimas, Tartter, Miller, & Keuthen, 1978; 
Green & Kuhl, 1991; Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998).
In Schweinberger and Soukup’s (1998) first two ex-
periments, participants classified computer-presented 
photographs of faces with respect to either identity (Per-
son A or Person B) or expression (happy or sad) while 
ignoring the other, irrelevant dimension. RTs for identity 
judgments did not differ across the control, orthogonal, 
and correlated conditions. RTs for expression judgments, 
on the other hand, were significantly different across 
the three conditions; specifically, RTs for the correlated 
condition were reliably shorter than those for the control 
condition, which in turn were reliably shorter than RTs 
for the orthogonal condition. In subsequent experiments, 
Schweinberger and Soukup found a similar pattern of re-
sults when identity and facial speech judgments were com-
pared. Identity judgments were not affected by variation 
in facial speech postures; however, when judging facial 
speech, participants were reliably faster in the correlated 
condition than in the control condition and reliably faster 
in the control condition than in the orthogonal condition. 
These asymmetric dependencies between the processing 
of facial identity, emotion, and speech indicate that ob-
servers are able to attend and respond to the identity of 
faces while ignoring emotional and speech expressions, 
but they are unable to ignore identity when attending and 
responding to either emotional expression or speech pos-
ture (Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998).
An alternative explanation for Schweinberger and 
Soukup’s (1998) findings is that the interference effect 
is due simply to a difference in the processing speeds of 
the two types of information, as is indicated by different 
overall RTs for the two tasks. Such a speed-of-processing 
account predicts that faster tasks can interfere with slower 
tasks, but the opposite is not true (see the introduction to 
Experiment 2 for a more detailed discussion). This ex-
planation is consistent with Schweinberger and Soukup’s 
results insofar as participants were faster to classify iden-
tity than they were to classify emotion (a finding that is 
also consistent with electrophysiological evidence that 
identity processing occurs substantially earlier than ex-
pression processing: Münte et al., 1998). In order to test 
this alternative explanation, Schweinberger et al. (1999) 
manipulated the difficulty of identity- and emotion-judg-
ment tasks by employing a computer morphing technique 
to create face stimuli that blended, to varying degrees, 
ASYMMETRIC INTERFERENCE IN FACE PERCEPTION    1201
either the identities of two faces within a given emotion or 
two emotions (happy and angry) within a given identity. 
Difficult stimuli were defined as 71:29 and 29:71 blends 
across the relevant dimension, and easy stimuli were de-
fined as the endpoints of these continua (100:0 and 0:100). 
The irrelevant dimension was not morphed; it remained 
fixed at the endpoints. Employing these stimuli in Garner 
tasks, Schweinberger et al. replicated Schweinberger and 
Soukup’s finding that variation in identity interfered with 
classifications of emotional expression, but variation in 
emotional expression did not interfere with classifications 
of identity. Importantly, they found that this asymmetric 
pattern of interference held even when identity was more 
difficult (and therefore took longer) to discriminate than 
emotion.
Also using the Garner paradigm, Baudouin et al. 
(2002) have demonstrated that schizophrenic individu-
als, as well as healthy controls, show this asymmetric 
interaction between the processing of facial expression 
and that of identity, despite the fact that schizophrenics 
tend to have impaired face-processing skills, especially in 
emotion recognition. Such impairments were manifest in 
the RTs of Baudouin et al.’s participants but not in their 
accuracy. Although the schizophrenic patients performed 
just as accurately as the healthy controls on the expres-
sion and identity classification tasks, the schizophrenics 
were considerably slower than the controls in every con-
dition in each task. Moreover, this RT deficit was greater 
for emotion classification than for identity classification. 
Nevertheless, a typical pattern of Garner interference was 
obtained with both the schizophrenics and the healthy 
participants without any significant difference between 
the two groups. Variation in identity increased RTs for 
classification of facial expression, but variation in facial 
expression did not influence RTs for classification of 
identity.
Interpreting Asymmetric Interference on Facial 
Variants of the Garner Paradigm
One explanation that Schweinberger et al. (1999) of-
fered for their findings of asymmetric Garner interfer-
ence is that identity information can provide a reference 
for computing information about facial speech and emo-
tion, but the opposite is not the case. Presumably, it is 
rather less likely that information about emotional and 
speech expressions can provide references for comput-
ing identity, for the very reason that such information is 
changeable. Cast in terms of Haxby et al.’s (2000) neu-
rological model, we can think of Schweinberger et al.’s 
results as indicating some form of interaction between 
neurological systems that code invariant aspects of faces 
and those that encode changeable aspects. Note that this 
conception of Haxby et al.’s model implies that the con-
nection between these two systems is one-way, or at least 
is considerably stronger in one direction than in the other. 
Although Haxby et al.’s depiction of their model shows a 
two-way arrow linking the distinct systems in which in-
variant and changeable aspects of faces are represented, 
this is an assumption for which no evidence is presented. 
Moreover, Haxby et al. remark, “The degree of separa-
tion between the functional roles played by the different 
regions . . . is unclear” (p. 231). Their only suggestion of 
a possible interaction between these two systems is a one-
way interaction, similar to our own proposal—namely, 
that the system that encodes invariant information about 
faces “may play a supportive role in the perception of ex-
pression, perhaps because different individuals can have 
characteristic expressions, such as a crooked smile or a 
wry grin, that we associate uniquely with them” (p. 231).
The sex of faces, like their identity, is a relatively in-
variant property. Thus, given our interpretations of Haxby 
et al.’s (2000) model and of the aforementioned findings 
of asymmetric Garner interference between facial iden-
tity and facial emotion judgments, we would expect task-
irrelevant variations in emotional expression to interfere 
with sex judgments, but we would not expect irrelevant 
variations in sex to interfere with expression judgments. 
However, Le Gal and Bruce (2002) used the Garner 
paradigm to examine the relationship between facial ex-
pression and sex processing and found little evidence of 
interference between these two dimensions. In two experi-
ments in this study, participants judged either the sex of 
faces or whether the faces expressed anger or surprise. 
In the first of these experiments, RTs to judge the sex of 
faces did not differ significantly among the correlated, 
control, and orthogonal conditions. RTs to judge emo-
tional expression did not differ between the control and 
orthogonal conditions, although RTs were significantly 
shorter in the correlated condition than in these two con-
ditions. This relationship was examined again in a second 
experiment, in which photographs of faces were cropped 
to remove the hairline and jawline in order to increase the 
difficulty of the sex classification task to approximately 
equal that of the emotion classification task, as indicated 
by equivalent overall RTs for the two tasks. For sex clas-
sifications, there were no significant differences among 
the three conditions. For expression classifications, RTs 
in the correlated condition were reliably shorter than RTs 
in the control condition, but there was no significant dif-
ference between the orthogonal and control conditions. In 
contrast to these speeded-judgment findings, however, a 
prior rating experiment showed that variation in emotional 
expression affected the perceived relative femininity or 
masculinity of faces; surprised expressions increased the 
judged femininity of faces and decreased their judged 
masculinity relative to angry expressions. These findings 
provide, in Le Gal and Bruce’s view, “qualified support” 
(p. 242) for the independence of facial emotion and sex 
processing.
The Present Study
To examine further the utility of Haxby et al.’s (2000) 
model, we investigated the interaction between sex (a par-
adigmatic example of invariance) and (paradigmatically 
changeable) emotional expression using two different 
speeded-response interference paradigms. If an invariant 
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aspect of facial information—identity or sex—can pro-
vide references for our judgments about more change-
able aspects of faces, including emotional and speech 
information, then we would expect to find asymmetric 
interference effects in experiments in which judgments 
about the sex of a face are pitted against judgments about 
its particular emotional expression. In Experiments 1 
and 2, we employed a variant of the Garner paradigm in 
which participants classified the emotion or sex of faces 
whose irrelevant dimension (their sex in the case of emo-
tion judgments, or their expressions in the case of sex 
judgments) either varied or remained constant. In Experi-
ment 3, we sought additional evidence from the Simon 
paradigm (Simon, 1990; Simon & Acosta, 1982; Simon 
& Rudell, 1967). In our facial variant of the Simon para-
digm, which we adapted from De Houwer, Hermans, and 
Eelen (1998), participants classified the emotional ex-
pression or sex of faces by saying a word that was either 
semantically congruent or semantically incongruent with 
the irrelevant dimension of the face. The Simon paradigm 
is widely thought to involve interference at an output 
stage of processing rather than at an earlier perceptual 
stage (see, e.g., Kornblum & Lee, 1995; Lu & Proctor, 
1995; Umiltà & Nicoletti, 1990, 1992). Given that Garner 
interference effects are sometimes interpreted in terms 
of perceptual interaction, a finding of the same pattern 
of asymmetric interference with the facial variants of the 
Garner and Simon paradigms would raise questions about 
the location of the interference and about whether the two 
tasks in fact tap the same source of interference. We shall 
return to these issues in the General Discussion.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants. Thirty-two students from University College Win-
chester were recruited for Experiments 1A and 1B and were paid for 
their participation. Sixteen of these students (12 female) took part 
in Experiment 1A (age range, 19–26 years; mean age, 21.1 years), 
and the other 16 (12 female) took part in Experiment 1B (age range, 
18–35 years; mean age, 20.9 years). All of the participants had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal eyesight.
Stimuli and Apparatus. Sixteen face stimuli were used in this 
experiment, in the form of digitized black-and-white photographs. 
Eight of the pictures showed different people with fearful facial ex-
pressions, and the remaining pictures showed the same individuals 
with happy facial expressions. Each set of fearful and happy faces 
consisted of four pictures of men and four pictures of women.
Each face stimulus was a caricatured version of a face from the 
Ekman and Friesen (1976) pictures of facial affect, taken from 
the FEEST database of facial expression stimuli (Young, Perrett, 
Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002). The expressions selected 
were computer caricatured by 50% using the techniques described 
by Calder, Young, Rowland, and Perrett (1997). Stimuli from the 
FEEST were chosen so that the expressions from which they were 
derived would be good exemplars of basic emotion categories, in-
cluding those of fear and happiness. Not only are the original Ekman 
and Friesen pictures among the most used and thus well-normed sets 
of facial affect stimuli, but, in addition, their caricatured versions 
are identified more quickly than their noncaricatured counterparts 
with no loss in accuracy (Calder et al., 1997), and people perceive 
caricatured expressions as more emotionally intense than their 
noncaricatured counterparts (Benson, Campbell, Harris, Frank, & 
Tovée, 1999; Calder et al., 2000). Another important feature of the 
selected stimuli was that the faces were cropped around the hair-
line, eliminating the possibility that participants might base their 
sex judgments on hairstyle. Our intention in using cropped hairlines 
was to make the sex-judgment task harder than usual, and by using 
caricatured expressions we hoped to make the expression-judgment 
task easier than usual. This was done to counter as much as possible 
the tendency for sex classification to be an easier task than emotion 
classification.
An Apple Macintosh PowerPC 8100/80 computer, running Su-
perlab 1.74 experimental software, controlled the stimulus displays 
and recorded RTs. All the faces appeared in the center of a uniform 
gray background, which covered the whole screen of the 12-in. color 
monitor in grayscale mode. When presented on the screen, the faces 
had a mean height of 10 cm (range, 9–11 cm) and a mean width of 
7.2 cm (range, 6–8 cm), subtending angles of 4.8º vertically and 3.4º 
horizontally at a viewing distance of 60 cm. Manual responses were 
recorded via the computer keyboard.
Design. The aim of Experiment 1A was to examine whether the 
sex of a face would influence judgments of its emotional expression, 
whereas the aim of Experiment 1B was to examine whether a face’s 
emotional expression would influence judgments of its sex. Since 
the contrast between orthogonal and control conditions is critical 
for establishing integral versus independent processing in the Gar-
ner task, with the correlated condition being of less theoretical in-
terest, we chose to simplify the experimental design by including 
only orthogonal and control conditions. Thus, in Experiment 1A we 
compared RTs for classifying expression (happy vs. fearful) when 
the faces were all of the same sex with RTs for classifying expres-
sion when the faces depicted males and females in equal propor-
tions. Similarly, in Experiment 1B we compared RTs for classifying 
faces as male or female when the faces all had the same expression 
with RTs for classifying sex when the faces had an equal mixture of 
happy and fearful expressions.
The set of 16 faces provided 8 stimuli for classifying the ex-
pressions of male faces (4 happy and 4 fearful) and 8 stimuli for 
classifying the expressions of female faces (4 happy and 4 fearful). 
Similarly, these 16 faces provided 8 stimuli for classifying the sex 
of happy faces (4 male and 4 female) and 8 stimuli for classify-
ing the sex of fearful faces (4 male and 4 female). For the tasks of 
classifying the expressions of faces that were either male or female 
(mixed sex) and classifying the sex of faces that were either happy 
or fearful (mixed emotion), 16 stimuli were available. Thus, in order 
to ensure an equal number of stimuli in each block of trials, the 16 
stimuli were divided into two matched blocks for the orthogonal 
conditions (i.e., mixed sex in Experiment 1A and mixed emotion 
in Experiment 1B).
For Experiment 1A, each orthogonal (mixed-sex) block consisted 
of one male (E.M. or J.J.) and one female (C. or M.O.), each with 
both happy and fearful expressions, and the control (single-sex) 
blocks consisted of two males (P.E. and W.F.) or two females (M.F. 
and S.W.), each with both happy and fearful expressions. Similarly, 
for Experiment 1B each orthogonal (mixed-emotion) block con-
sisted of one male (E.M. or J.J.) and one female (C. or M.O.), each 
with both happy and fearful expressions, and each control (single-
emotion) block consisted of two males (P.E. and W.F.) and two fe-
males (M.F. and S.W.) showing either all happy expressions or all 
fearful expressions. For both experiments, each of the four different 
stimuli within each block was presented eight times, yielding a total 
of 32 trials per block. All trials within each block were presented in 
a pseudorandom order.
Eight different versions of Experiment 1A and eight different ver-
sions of Experiment 1B were created, and the participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of these 16 versions. These different versions 
of the experiments were created in order to control for (1) the order 
of presentation of the four blocks within an experiment (four differ-
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ent orders determined by a Latin square design) and (2) the stimulus–
response mapping—that is, the way in which the two response keys 
were matched with the responses (“fearful” and “happy” in Experi-
ment 1A, and “male” and “female” in Experiment 1B).
Procedure. The participants were seated in a quiet room in front 
of the computer, approximately 60 cm from the monitor screen. 
Written instructions were presented on the screen and summarized 
orally by the experimenter. Each trial began with a fixation cross 
(), which appeared in the center of the screen for 1,500 msec. 
The fixation cross was followed immediately by a stimulus face, 
which also appeared in the center of the screen. The face remained 
on the screen until the participant’s keypress triggered its offset, 
at which point the fixation cross appeared again, followed by the 
next stimulus. The response keys were “z” and “/,” which were 
located 17 cm apart on the row of the keyboard second from the 
bottom. The participants were asked to respond as quickly and ac-
curately as possible to the emotional expression displayed by the 
face (for Experiment 1A) or to the face’s sex (for Experiment 1B) 
and to ignore other aspects of the face. The experiments began with 
a practice block consisting of each of the 16 faces presented once, 
in pseudorandom order.
Results
Incorrect responses accounted for 2.8% of the data 
overall. Outliers, defined as RTs greater than 3,000 msec, 
accounted for only two datapoints, one in each task; these 
were excluded from the RT and error analyses.
Response times. The mean correct RTs were initially 
analyzed in a mixed-design ANOVA with task (sex clas-
sification vs. emotion classification) as the between-
subjects variable and condition (orthogonal vs. control) as 
the repeated measures variable. There were main effects 
of task [F(1,30)  15.01, p  .005; η2  .33] and condi-
tion [F(1,30)  9.48, p  .01; η2  .24]. The main effect 
of task indicated that, averaged across condition, the par-
ticipants were reliably slower to judge the emotions (M  
668 msec, SEM  23) than they were to judge the sex 
(M  544 msec, SEM  23) of the faces. The main effect 
of condition indicated that, averaged across tasks, the par-
ticipants were reliably slower in the orthogonal condition 
(M  622 msec, SEM  18) than in the control condition 
(M  590 msec, SEM  15). Of greater theoretical inter-
est was the task  condition interaction [F(1,30)  6.59, 
p  .05; η2  .18]. This interaction is depicted in Figure 1, 
which indicates that there was a clear effect of condition 
for emotional expression classifications but not for sex 
classifications. This was confirmed by simple main effect 
analyses of the effect of condition for each task separately. 
When the participants were required to judge the emotion 
of the faces, they were slower to respond in orthogonal 
blocks (M  698 msec, SEM  26) than in control blocks 
[M  638 msec, SEM  22; F(1,15)  22.19, p  .005; 
η2  .59]. However, when the participants were required 
to judge the sex of the faces, there was no difference be-
tween responses to orthogonal blocks (M  546 msec, 
SEM  26) and those to control blocks [M  541 msec, 
SEM  22; F(1,15)  .10, p  .5; η2  .007].
In order to compare RTs for every combination of each 
relevant and each irrelevant dimension, separate ANOVAs 
were carried out for each task, with the repeated measures 
variables of condition, sex, and expression. For expres-
sion classifications, there were significant main effects 
of condition [F(1,15)  20.7, p  .001; η2  .58] and 
emotion [F(1,15)  10.17, p  .01; η2  .404], but no 
significant interactions. The new finding revealed by this 
ANOVA is that the participants were slower to judge fear-
ful facial expressions as fearful (M  704 msec, SEM  
37) than they were to judge happy facial expressions as 
happy (M  640 msec, SEM  24), averaged across con-
dition. For sex classifications, no main effects of condi-
tion, sex, or expression reached significance. No interac-
Figure 1. Mean response times (RTs) for classifying the emotion (Experi-
ment 1A) and sex (Experiment 1B) of faces in the control and orthogonal condi-
tions of the Garner paradigm.
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tions reached significance either, but the emotion  sex 
interaction approached significance [F(1,15)  4.4, p  
.053; η2  .227]. Inspection of Figure 2 reveals that the 
participants were somewhat slower to judge a fearful male 
face as male than they were to judge a happy male face as 
male, but there was essentially no difference in their RTs 
to judging fearful versus happy female faces as female.
Errors. A subsidiary set of analyses was used to exam-
ine error rates. Two separate one-way repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted to examine the percentage of 
errors for each block type in each task. For emotion classi-
fication, error rates were higher for the orthogonal blocks 
(M  5.67%, SEM  1.33) than for the control blocks 
(M  1.95%, SEM  0.56) [F(1,15)  12.12, p  .01; 
η2  .45]. For sex classification, error rates were not sig-
nificantly different between the orthogonal (M  2.05%, 
SEM  0.51) and the control (M  1.56%, SEM  0.47) 
blocks [F(1,15)  0.63, p  .1; η2  .04].
Discussion
The main result of this experiment was that RTs were 
longer in the orthogonal than in the control condition of 
the emotion classification task, whereas there was no 
significant difference in RTs between the orthogonal and 
control conditions for sex classification. The error rates 
followed the same pattern, with more errors in the orthog-
onal condition than in the control condition for emotion 
classification but not for sex classification, thus confirm-
ing that the RT results were not due to a speed–accuracy 
trade-off. Despite the lack of an overall interference effect 
for sex classification, the more finely grained RT analysis 
of the intratask relationships yielded some evidence to 
suggest that a face’s expression can influence sex classi-
fication; RTs to male faces portraying fearful expressions 
tended to be longer than RTs to male faces portraying 
happy expressions.
On the standard interpretation of Garner interference, 
the overall asymmetric interference effect obtained in Ex-
periment 1 can be construed as evidence that although 
people are able to attend selectively to the sex of faces 
while ignoring variations in facial expression, they are 
less able to attend selectively to facial expressions while 
ignoring variations in the sex of the faces. (However, the 
nearly significant emotion  sex interaction for sex clas-
sification suggests that for the male faces in this experi-
ment, the participants could not entirely ignore variations 
in emotional expression.)
EXPERIMENT 2
Our second experiment had two aims. One was to rep-
licate our finding of asymmetric Garner interference be-
tween sex and emotion classification, given that Le Gal 
and Bruce (2002) did not find such an effect. The other 
aim of this experiment was to examine whether or not this 
asymmetric interference would still be evident when the 
sex and emotion classification tasks were more equal in 
difficulty, which would argue against an account of the 
asymmetric relationship in terms of relative processing 
speeds.
According to a speed-of-processing account, the asym-
metric pattern of interference is at least partially a result 
of the mismatch in task difficulty (Le Gal & Bruce, 2002; 
Melara & Mounts, 1993; Schweinberger et al., 1999), as 
is indicated by longer RTs and higher error scores for 
emotion classifications in comparison with sex classifi-
cations. The basic argument would run as follows: Infor-
mation concerning the sex of faces (being the more dis-
criminable dimension) is computed before the emotional 
expression (the less discriminable dimension) has been 
determined. Consequently, when the task is to classify 
sex in the orthogonal condition of the Garner paradigm, a 
Figure 2. Mean response times (RTs) for classifying the sex of faces (Experi-
ment 1B) as a function of the emotion on the faces.
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response can usually be initiated before information about 
the face’s emotional expression has been fully processed. 
But when the task is to classify emotion in the orthogo-
nal condition, the sex of the face is determined before a 
response regarding its emotion can be initiated, and thus 
information regarding the sex of the face is available as a 
reference for processing information regarding its emo-
tional expression.
Attempts to equate or reverse the initial difficulty of 
the paired tasks in facial variants of the Garner paradigm 
do not provide strong support for such an argument, how-
ever. Le Gal and Bruce (2002) did not find any significant 
interference effects between sex and emotion classifica-
tions in an experiment in which both classifications were 
assumed to be approximately equal in difficulty, as is evi-
denced by approximately equal mean RTs in the two tasks 
(in fact, sex classifications were marginally though not 
significantly slower than emotion classifications). This is 
admittedly not strong evidence against the mismatch-in-
difficulty argument for sex versus emotion classification, 
since Le Gal and Bruce found no interference effect in an 
experiment in which emotion classifications took longer 
(i.e., were more difficult) than sex classifications. Yet a 
mismatch in task difficulty is unlikely to be able to account 
entirely for our own finding of an asymmetric relationship 
between facial emotion and sex classification. As was noted 
earlier, Schweinberger et al. (1999) found that equating and 
even reversing task difficulty did not eliminate the same 
asymmetric pattern of interference between identity and 
expression classifications. This suggests that we should 
also expect equating or reversing task difficulty to preserve 
our interference effects, given our assumptions that invari-
ant and changeable aspects of faces are represented in dis-
tinct processing routes and that the sex of faces, like their 
identity, is a relatively invariant property.
Despite this reason for doubting a relative speed-of-
processing account of our asymmetric interference effect, 
it behoved us to test directly the validity of such an ac-
count. Consequently, we attempted to vary the difficulty of 
(and thus the RTs for) the sex and emotion classification 
tasks in Experiment 2 by morphing the faces across the 
task-relevant dimension (cf. Schweinberger et al., 1999).
Method
Participants. Thirty-two students from the University of Dur-
ham were recruited; 16 (8 female; age range, 19–21 years; mean 
age, 20.1 years) took part in Experiment 2A, whereas the other 16 
(8 female; age range, 19–22 years; mean age, 20.9 years) took part 
in Experiment 2B. All of the participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal eyesight.
Stimuli and Apparatus. The bases for the stimulus set in Ex-
periment 2 were faces from the FEEST set (Young et al., 2002) 
comprising four males (E.M., J.J., P.E., and W.F.) and four females 
(C., M.F., M.O., and N.R.) with both fearful and happy caricatured 
(50%) expressions. (Thus, the faces were the same as those used 
in Experiment 1, with the exception of one of the female faces.) Two 
sets of morphed continua were created from these original faces. For 
Experiment 2A (emotion classification), each of the eight identities 
was morphed across emotion (e.g., J.J.’s face morphed from happy to 
fearful) with identity and thus sex held constant. For Experiment 2B 
(sex classification), the faces were morphed across sex and thus 
identity, with expression held constant, so that one particular female 
face and one particular male face were morphed together with their 
fearful expressions and again with their happy expressions. (C. was 
paired with W.F., M.F. with E.M., M.O. with J.J., and N.R. with P.E.) 
The choice of the particular female and male faces to be morphed 
together was based on the criterion that they should have as many 
Facial Action Coding System (Ekman & Friesen, 1978) action units 
in common as possible for each emotion (action unit data obtained 
from Young et al., 2002). Six equidistant morph levels were selected 
for the morphed continua of emotion and sex: 75:25, 65:35, 55:45, 
45:55, 35:65, and 25:75 (the ratios expressing proportions of ini-
tial image to final image). This resulted in a total of 48 different 
stimuli in each set, each of which was presented four times during 
the course of the experiment, resulting in a total of 192 trials for 
Experiment 2A and 192 trials for Experiment 2B.
The stimulus presentation and recording of RTs was controlled by 
Superlab 1.74 experimental software running on an Apple Macintosh 
G3 computer with a 19-in. color monitor in grayscale mode. The 
dimensions of the stimuli on the screen were the same as those in 
Experiment 1. Manual responses were recorded via the computer 
keyboard.
Design. For reasons similar to those that apply to Experiment 1, 
two orthogonal and two control conditions were created for each 
of Experiments 2A and 2B. For Experiment 2A, each orthogonal 
(mixed-sex) block consisted of one female and one male (C. with 
W.F. or M.O. with J.J.), each morphed across emotion, and the con-
trol (single-sex) blocks consisted of two females (M.F. and N.R.) 
or two males (E.M. and P.E.), each morphed across emotion. For 
Experiment 2B, each orthogonal (mixed-emotion) block consisted 
of one female–male pair (C. with W.F. or M.O. with J.J.) morphed 
across identity (and thus sex) for their fearful expressions and again 
for their happy expressions, whereas the control (single-emotion) 
blocks consisted of two female–male pairs (M.F. with E.M. and N.R. 
with P.E.) morphed across either their happy or their fearful expres-
sions. For both Experiments 2A and 2B, within each block, each of 
the 12 different stimuli (2 morphed continua  6 morph levels) was 
presented four times, yielding a total of 48 trials per block. All trials 
within each block were presented in a pseudorandom order.
As in Experiment 1, eight different versions of Experiment 2A 
and eight different versions of Experiment 2B were created, per-
mitting counterbalancing of block order and stimulus–response 
mapping. The participants were randomly assigned to 1 of these 16 
different versions.
Procedure. The procedural details were the same as those for Ex-
periment 1, except that this time the practice block consisted of each 
of the eight morphed continua presented twice, once at the 75:25 
morph level and once at the 25:75 morph level, in pseudorandom 
order. As in Experiment 1, the task was to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible to the emotional expression displayed by each 
face (for Experiment 2A) or to the face’s sex (for Experiment 2B) 
while ignoring other aspects of the face.
Results
Classification performance. Figure 3 depicts the 
percentages of “fearful” and “male” responses for emo-
tion and sex classification, respectively, as a function of 
morph level and experimental condition. With respect 
to the control and orthogonal conditions of the emotion 
classification task, it can be seen that except for the most 
ambiguous morph levels (i.e., those with either 55:45 or 
45:55 proportions of the two emotions), the stimuli were 
very consistently classified as displaying either fear or 
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happiness. With respect to the control and orthogonal 
conditions of the sex classification task, on the other 
hand, the stimuli were not as consistently classified as 
male or female, even for the morph levels toward the end-
points of the continua. These data were initially subjected 
to an ANOVA across tasks, with repeated measures on 
the variables of condition and morph level. This mixed-
design ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of con-
dition [F(1,30)  4.4, p  .05; η2  .13] and a highly 
significant main effect of morph level [F(1.7,50.9)  
228.97, p  .001; η2  .88, Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rected]. The main effect of condition reflected the fact 
that the mean ratio of “female” to “male” or “happy” to 
“fearful” responses was reliably greater in the control 
conditions (M  57.4:42.6, SEM  1.8) than in the or-
thogonal conditions (M  54.0:46.0, SEM  1.3). Pair-
wise comparisons (Bonferonni corrected, α  .05) for 
the variable of morph level revealed that, averaged over 
task and condition, all morph levels differed significantly 
from each other. The main effect of task approached sig-
nificance [F(1,30)  3.89, p  .058; η2  .12], reflect-
ing a tendency for the mean ratio of “female” to “male” 
responses in the sex classification task (M  58.4:41.6, 
SEM  1.9) to be greater than the mean ratio of “happy” 
to “fearful” responses in the emotion classification task 
(M  53.0:47.0, SEM  1.9). These main effects were 
modified by a significant task  morph level interaction 
[F(5,150)  26.53, p  .001; η2  .47], which was in 
turn modified by a significant task  condition  morph 
level interaction [F(5,150)  7.01, p  .001; η2  .19].
To follow up on this significant three-way interaction, 
separate ANOVAs were conducted for each task, with re-
peated measures on the variables of condition and morph 
level. There were highly significant main effects of morph 
level for both emotion classification [F(2.17,32.56)  
481.17, p  .001; η2  .97] and sex classification 
[F(1.34,20.02)  34.53, p  .001; η2  .7; Greenhouse–
Geisser corrected in both cases]. Pairwise comparisons 
(Bonferonni corrected, α  .05) for the variable of morph 
level revealed that, for emotion classification, all morph 
levels differed significantly from each other except for 
levels 35:65 and 25:75, whereas for sex classification, 
morph levels 55:45 and 45:55 did not differ significantly 
from each other. There was no main effect of condition 
for either sex or emotion classification, although in the 
case of the latter there was a nonsignificant trend toward 
a higher mean ratio of “happiness” responses to “fear-
ful” responses in the control (M  54.2:45.8, SEM  1.4) 
than in the orthogonal (M  51.8:48.2, SEM  1.3) con-
ditions [F(1,15)  4.13, p  .06; η2  .22]. There were 
significant condition  morph interactions for both emo-
tion classification [F(2.92,43.81)  3.55, p  .05; η2  
.19, Greenhouse–Geisser corrected] and sex classifica-
tion [F(5,75)  5.19, p  .001; η2  .26]. As Figure 3 
indicates, these interactions reflected differences between 
the control and orthogonal conditions for some but not 
all morph levels, which was confirmed by simple main-
effects analyses. For emotion classification, the consis-
tency of response was higher in the control than in the 
orthogonal conditions for morph levels 75:25, 45:55, and 
35:65, whereas for sex classification the consistency of 
response was higher in the orthogonal than in the control 
conditions for morph levels 75:25 and 65:35 [all ps  
.05; morph level 55:45 approached significance for sex 
classification ( p  .057)].
Classification response times. In order to analyze the 
RTs to stimuli of different levels of difficulty on the task-
relevant dimension, we collapsed the data from the six 
Figure 3. Percentages of “fearful” or “male” responses, depending on task 
and condition in Experiment 2, as a function of morph level (happy:fearful, or 
female:male).
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individual morph levels into three levels of difficulty: 1 
(75:25 and 25:75), 2 (65:35 and 35:65), and 3 (55:45 and 
45:55). Since our primary goal was to select certain lev-
els of morphing to test whether asymmetric interference 
would still be evident when task difficulty was equated, 
and because it is not very meaningful to analyze RTs at 
near-chance levels of performance, we entered into the 
RT analyses the data for difficulty levels 1 and 2 only. We 
initially performed an ANOVA across tasks, with repeated 
measures on the variables of condition (control vs. or-
thogonal) and difficulty level (1 vs. 2). There was no main 
effect of task [F(1,30)  0.06, p  .5; η2  .002], indicat-
ing that RTs for the classification of sex (M  900 msec, 
SEM  68) were similar to those for the classification of 
emotion (M  877 msec, SEM  68). The main effects of 
condition and difficulty did not reach significance either 
(all Fs  0.2). However, there was a significant task  
difficulty interaction [F(1,30)  7.47, p  .05; η2  .2], 
a significant task  condition interaction [F(1,30)  
15.67, p  .001; η2  .34], and a significant condition  
difficulty interaction [F(1,30)  4.24, p  .05; η2  .12]. 
These two-way interactions were modified by a signifi-
cant task  difficulty  condition interaction [F(1,30)  
4.78, p  .05; η2  .14].
To analyze these interactions further, we performed 
separate ANOVAs for each task, with repeated measures 
on the variables of condition (control vs. orthogonal), dif-
ficulty level (1 [easier] vs. 2 [more difficult]), and irrel-
evant dimension of the face (male vs. female in the case of 
emotion classification, and fear vs. happiness in the case 
of sex classification). For emotion classification, there 
was a significant main effect of condition [F(1,15)  
15.22, p  .005; η2  .5], reflecting the expected re-
sult—namely, that RTs in the orthogonal condition (M  
914 msec, SEM  46) were reliably longer than RTs in 
the control condition (M  835 msec, SEM  42). There 
was also a significant main effect of difficulty [F(1,15)  
6.97, p  .05; η2  .32], reflecting the fact that the par-
ticipants were slower to respond to morphed faces of 
Difficulty Level 2 (M  906 msec, SEM  49) than to 
morphed faces of Difficulty Level 1 (M  842 msec, 
SEM  40). There was no significant main effect of the 
sex of the face, and none of the interactions was signifi-
cant (all Fs  1).
For sex classification, there was a significant main effect 
of condition [F(1,15)  5.21, p  .05; η2  .26], reflecting 
the fact that, overall, RTs in the orthogonal condition (M  
856 msec, SEM  74) were reliably shorter than RTs in the 
control condition (M  933 msec, SEM  98). There was 
also a significant main effect of difficulty [F(1,15)  7.86, 
p  .05; η2  .34], which was due to the fact that, overall, 
the participants were faster to respond to morphed faces 
of Difficulty Level 2 (M  867 msec, SEM  80) than 
to morphed faces of Difficulty Level 1 (M  922 msec, 
SEM  90). These main effects were modified by a sig-
nificant condition  difficulty interaction [F(1,15)  8.95, 
p  .01; η2  .37]. Simple main-effects analyses for this 
significant interaction revealed that RTs for faces of Dif-
ficulty Level 1 were significantly shorter in the orthogonal 
condition (M  846 msec, SEM  75) than in the con-
trol condition [M  1,000 msec, SEM  108; F(1,15)  
11.56, p  .005; η2  .44], but that for faces of Difficulty 
Level 2 there was no significant difference in RTs between 
the control (M  896 msec, SEM  89) and the orthogonal 
(M  859 msec, SEM  79) conditions [F(1,15)  1.14, 
p  .1; η2  .07].
Discussion
Morphing the faces across the task-relevant dimension 
clearly affected the difficulty of the corresponding task. 
The more the faces were blended on the relevant dimen-
sion, the more difficult the task became, as is indicated 
by both longer RTs and the decrease in consistency of the 
participants’ responses. Crucially, these manipulations of 
task difficulty had the effect of equating the overall RTs 
across the emotion and sex classification tasks. Neverthe-
less, we still found an asymmetric pattern of Garner inter-
ference. The direction of this asymmetric interference was 
the same as that found in Experiment 1—that is, variation 
in the sex of the faces interfered with emotion classifica-
tion performance more than variation in expression inter-
fered with sex classification performance. Although sex 
classifications remained relatively unaffected by changes 
in facial expression, there was some evidence of an in-
teraction, insofar as RTs were reliably shorter in the or-
thogonal condition than in the control condition for faces 
of Difficulty Level 1 (75:25 and 25:75 morphs). In sum, 
the results of this experiment suggest that differences in 
processing speed cannot account for the asymmetric rela-
tionship between facial emotion and sex processing.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the value of distin-
guishing the processing of invariant aspects of faces from 
that of changeable aspects in interpreting asymmetric in-
terference on facial variants of the Garner paradigm. The 
purpose of Experiment 3 was to determine whether the im-
plementation of a different interference paradigm—a facial 
variant of De Houwer et al.’s (1998) affective Simon para-
digm—would converge on the same pattern of findings.
De Houwer et al. (1998) investigated the effect of an 
irrelevant dimension on speeded forced-choice judgments 
about faces by using a variant of the affective Simon para-
digm (De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001; 
De Houwer & Eelen, 1998). Like the Garner paradigm, 
the Simon paradigm requires participants to respond to 
stimuli along a particular dimension while a second di-
mension of the stimulus is varied. However, unlike in the 
Garner paradigm, the required response is related to the 
irrelevant dimension. In De Houwer et al.’s (1998) study, 
participants classified the sex or identity of faces with a 
verbal response that was either congruent or incongruent 
with the valence of the facial expressions. The stimuli were 
photographs of two male and two female faces with both 
positive (happy) and negative (fearful, angry, disgusted, 
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and sad) expressions. In the sex classification task, half 
of the participants were asked to say “positive” if the face 
was male and “negative” if the face was female, whereas 
the remaining participants were asked to give the converse 
responses (i.e., “negative” to male faces and “positive” to 
female faces). In the identification task, the participants 
were asked to say “positive” to two of the four stimulus 
faces (one male and one female) and “negative” to the 
other two faces. (The female and male faces assigned the 
“positive” and “negative” responses were determined in 
a prior learning phase of the experiment.) In both tasks, 
the participants were told to ignore the expressions on 
the faces.
Vocal RTs were reliably shorter on congruent than on 
incongruent trials in the identity classification task in 
De Houwer et al.’s (1998) study, but not in their sex classi-
fication task. That is, for identity but not sex classification, 
the participants were faster when the valence of the facial 
expression matched the valence of the correct response 
(“positive” to faces with positive emotional expressions 
and “negative” to faces with negative emotional expres-
sions) than when they did not match. Although there was 
no significant congruency effect in the sex classification 
task, RTs were shorter for the congruent than for the in-
congruent trials in both instances of this task. De Houwer 
et al. (1998) speculated that further studies with more sta-
tistical power might show this trend to be significant.
Our modified version of De Houwer et al.’s (1998) task 
employed exactly the same faces as those used in Experi-
ment 1. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, the required 
response in Experiment 3 was vocal and semantically re-
lated to the irrelevant dimension. Participants classified 
emotional expression either by saying “male” for happy 
faces and “female” for fearful faces or by saying the con-
verse (i.e., “female” for happy faces and “male” for fear-
ful faces), and they classified the sex of the faces either 
by saying “fearful” for male faces and “happy” for female 
faces or by saying the converse. Thus, our Simon task is 
analogous to a Stroop task (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935) 
insofar as the relevant and the irrelevant dimensions in the 
Simon task can be semantically congruent (e.g., requiring 
responses of “male” to happy male faces and “female” to 
fearful female faces) or semantically incongruent (e.g., 
requiring responses of “male” to happy female faces and 
“female” to fearful male faces). The two paradigms dif-
fer to the extent that, in the Stroop but not in the Simon 
paradigm, the relevant stimulus dimension overlaps with 
the response set and the irrelevant feature dimension (see 
Kornblum & Lee, 1995).
Method
Participants. Twenty-eight psychology students (15 female) 
from University College Winchester took part in the experiment. 
All were 19 to 45 years of age (M  26.2 years) and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal eyesight.
Stimuli and Apparatus. In Experiment 3, we employed the 
same stimuli as in Experiment 1—that is, 16 digitized black-and-
white photographs of four male and four female faces from the 
FEEST database of facial expression stimuli (Young et al., 2002), 
with both happy and fearful caricatured expressions. These stimuli 
were presented in the same dimensions and on the same computer 
and monitor as they were in Experiment 1, but this time the stimu-
lus presentation and recording of RTs was controlled by PsyScope 
1.2.4 experimental software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 
1993). Vocal responses were recorded via a headset microphone 
connected to the computer via a response box and the keyboard.
Design. Each participant undertook two tasks: sex classification 
and emotion classification. Half of the participants classified the 
sex of the faces first and then classified the emotion of the faces; the 
other half of the participants completed the tasks in the reverse order. 
For sex classification, half of the participants were required to re-
spond “happy” to male faces and “fearful” to female faces, whereas 
the remaining participants were asked to respond “fearful” to male 
faces and “happy” to female faces. For emotion classification, half 
of the participants were required to respond “male” to happy faces 
and “female” to fearful faces, whereas the remaining participants 
were asked to respond “male” to fearful faces and “female” to happy 
faces. Four versions of each experiment were created—one for each 
combination of task order and response mapping—and the partici-
pants were randomly assigned to them. Within each task, there were 
five blocks of 16 trials. Each of the 16 faces was presented once in 
each block, in a pseudorandom order.
Procedure. The participants were seated in a quiet room in front 
of the computer, approximately 60 cm from the monitor screen. 
Written instructions were presented on the screen and summarized 
orally by the experimenter. Each trial began with the warning GET 
READY! presented in the center of the screen for 1,000 msec. This 
was followed by a 1,000-msec blank screen interval, at the end of 
which a stimulus face appeared in the center of the screen. The face 
stimulus remained on the screen until the participant’s vocal re-
sponse triggered its offset. Following a 200-msec interval, a central 
fixation cross appeared in the center of the screen until its offset 
was triggered by the experimenter’s pressing one of three keys on 
the keyboard, which coded the vocal response and any erroneous 
activation of the voice key. An interval of 1,000 msec preceded the 
beginning of the next trial. The participants were asked to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible to either the sex or the emotional 
expression of the faces, depending on the task, and to ignore other 
aspects of the faces.
Results
Response times. Incorrect responses and trials in 
which the vocal response failed to activate the voice key 
accounted for 9.2% of the total responses and were not 
included in the RT analyses. Mean correct RTs were ini-
tially analyzed with a two-way ANOVA, with task (emo-
tion classification vs. sex classification) and congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent) as repeated measures vari-
ables. There were main effects of task [F(1,27)  39.98, 
p  .001; η2  .6] and congruency [F(1,27)  28.27, 
p  .001; η2  .51]. The main effect of task showed that 
responses were slower for emotion classification (M  
900 msec, SEM  23) than for sex classification (M  
773 msec, SEM  20). The main effect of congruency 
showed that responses were slower on incongruent (M  
852 msec, SEM  19) than on congruent (M  821 msec, 
SEM  19) trials. These main effects were modified by 
a significant task  congruency interaction [F(1,27)  
4.69, p  .05; η2  .15], which is depicted in Figure 4. As 
can be seen from this figure, the participants were slower 
to respond in the incongruent conditions than in the con-
gruent conditions when classifying emotion, but not when 
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they were classifying sex; furthermore, they were faster 
in classifying emotion than in classifying sex. This was 
confirmed by simple main-effect analyses of congruence 
for each task separately. When judging emotional expres-
sions, the participants were significantly slower when the 
correct responses were incongruent with the irrelevant di-
mension (i.e., the sex) of the face (M  925 msec, SEM  
24) than when they were congruent [M  875 msec, 
SEM  23; F(1,27)  27.4, p  .001; η2  .5]. In the 
sex classification task, there was no significant difference 
between RTs to incongruent (M  779 msec, SEM  22) 
and to congruent [M  768 msec, SEM  19; F(1,27)  
1.02, p  .1; η2  .036] stimuli.
It was not possible to compare RTs for every combi-
nation of each relevant and each irrelevant dimension 
for each task in this experiment, as was done for Experi-
ment 1. This is because in Experiment 3 the participants 
were not presented with all possible combinations of each 
relevant and each irrelevant dimension in each condition. 
Consider, for example, those participants who classified 
emotion by saying “male” for happy faces and “female” 
for fearful faces and classified sex by saying “happy” for 
male faces and “fearful” for female faces. These partici-
pants saw only happy male and fearful female faces in 
the congruent conditions of both the emotion classifica-
tion and sex classification tasks, and they saw only fearful 
male and happy female faces in the incongruent condi-
tions of both tasks.
Errors. We examined error rates through a subsidiary 
set of analyses. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
with variables of task (emotion classification vs. sex clas-
sification) and congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) 
was conducted to examine the percentage of errors for 
each condition in each task. There were main effects of 
task [F(1,27)  9.68, p  .01; η2  .26] and congruency 
[F(1,27)  26.29, p  .001; η2  .49]. The main effect 
of task indicated that error rates were reliably higher for 
emotion classification (M  11.4%, SEM  1.5) than for 
sex classification (M  6.0%, SEM  1.1). The main ef-
fect of congruency indicated that error rates were reliably 
higher in the incongruent condition (M  10.8%, SEM  
1.2) than in the congruent condition (M  6.6%, SEM  
1.0). These main effects were modified by a significant 
task  congruency interaction [F(1,27)  12.71, p  
.005; η2  .32], which is depicted in Figure 5. As this fig-
ure indicates, the participants made approximately twice 
as many errors in the incongruent (M  15.1%, SEM  
2.1) than in the congruent (M  7.7%, SEM  1.2) condi-
tion when classifying emotion, but when classifying sex 
they showed essentially no difference in their error rates 
between these two conditions.
Discussion
The participants were significantly slower to classify 
emotion when the required response (“male” or “female”) 
was incongruent with the sex of the face in comparison 
with when the response and the sex of the face were con-
gruent. No such significant congruency effect was evident 
for sex classification, however. The error rates followed 
the same pattern, with more errors in the incongruent than 
in the congruent condition for emotion classification but 
not for sex classification, confirming that the RT results 
were not due to a speed–accuracy trade-off. Thus, we have 
found a facial variant of a semantic Simon effect (De Hou-
wer, 1998) but not of an affective Simon effect—at least 
not in a sex classification task, which corroborates De 
Houwer et al.’s (1998) finding. This asymmetry in the in-
teractions between the processing of the emotion and the 
sex of faces mirrors the asymmetric dependency found in 
Experiments 1 and 2.
Figure 4. Mean response times (RTs) for classifying the emotion and sex of 
faces in the incongruent and congruent conditions (Simon paradigm) of Ex-
periment 3. 
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It is worth noting that the sex classification task in Ex-
periment 3 was completed more slowly than the emotion 
classification task in Experiment 1 (773 vs. 668 msec). 
This too counts against a purely speed-based account of 
the asymmetric interference, because the shorter RTs in 
the Experiment 1 emotion classification task than in the 
Experiment 3 sex classification task indicate that infor-
mation about emotion must have been available during 
the sex classification task in Experiment 3, yet there was 
no interference in the latter task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study provides convergent evidence, from two 
different interference paradigms, of an asymmetric rela-
tionship between the processes underlying performance 
on facial emotion and sex classification tasks. Emotion 
classification was significantly influenced by irrelevant 
variations in the sex of the faces (Experiments 1 and 2) 
and by the semantic relatedness of the vocal response to 
the sex of the faces (Experiment 3). Sex classification, 
on the other hand, was less influenced by both irrelevant 
variations in facial expression and the semantic related-
ness of the vocal response to the facial expression. Nev-
ertheless, Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence that in-
formation concerning emotional expressions did impinge 
to a limited extent on sex classification performance. Spe-
cifically, the participants in Experiment 1 were slower to 
classify male faces as male when those faces portrayed 
fearful expressions in comparison with when they por-
trayed happy expressions, and in Experiment 2, sex classi-
fications were slower in the control than in the orthogonal 
conditions for faces morphed across sex at the easiest of 
the difficulty levels.
The lack of Garner interference between sex and emo-
tion classification in Le Gal and Bruce’s (2002) study 
is not consistent with our results. There are several pos-
sible reasons for the different findings in the two studies, 
including the fact that Le Gal and Bruce employed sur-
prised and angry expressions whereas we used expres-
sions of fear and happiness. Although we have no specific 
reason to suspect that different emotions might produce 
different patterns of Garner interference, an avenue for 
future research will be to examine the robustness of the 
asymmetric pattern of interference by conducting studies 
in which different combinations of emotional expressions 
are employed.
Haxby et al.’s (2000) face-processing model provides a 
useful framework for interpreting the findings of asym-
metric dependencies between identity processing and 
facial and speech expression processing, as reported by 
Schweinberger and Soukup (1998), Schweinberger et al. 
(1999), and Baudouin et al. (2002). In this model, invariant 
and changeable aspects of faces are represented through 
distinct processing routes. According to the interpreta-
tion of Haxby et al.’s model that we presented in the intro-
duction, asymmetric Garner interference indicates some 
form of interaction between these distinct neurological 
systems. The direction of the asymmetric dependencies 
is consistent with the further plausible assumption that 
identity information (which is paradigmatically invariant) 
is much more likely to provide a reference for computing 
information about facial speech and emotion (which is 
paradigmatically changeable) than vice versa. The sex of 
faces, like their identity, is a relatively invariant property. 
Moreover, whereas the extent to which sex processing and 
identity processing are independent has been a matter of 
debate (see Young, 1998, for discussion) and a degree of 
Figure 5. Mean percentage errors for classifying the emotion and sex of faces 
in the incongruent and congruent conditions (Simon paradigm) of Experi-
ment 3.
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independence has been convincingly established (Bruce 
et al., 1987), a variety of recent evidence suggests that 
the sex and identity of faces are processed through a single 
route (see, e.g., Calder, Burton, Miller, Young, & Akamatsu, 
2001; Dubois et al., 1999; Ganel & Goshen-Gottstein, 
2002; Goshen-Gottstein & Ganel, 2000), as Haxby et al.’s 
(2000) conception of involvement of a neurological path-
way in the analysis of invariant properties of faces would 
suggest. Thus, our finding of asymmetric Garner interfer-
ence between sex and emotion classification is consistent 
with this particular reading of Haxby et al.’s model.
Our explanation of the asymmetry of the interference on 
facial variants of the Garner paradigm in terms of Haxby 
et al.’s (2000) model has so far relied on the intuition that 
changeable properties of faces, by their very nature, pro-
vide a less stable basis for further computations and are 
more context sensitive than relatively invariant properties 
of faces. There is a growing body of evidence consistent 
with this intuition. Our judgments of others’ emotional 
states are influenced by our expectations regarding those 
people and the social contexts in which the emotions are 
expressed (see, e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Hess & Kir-
ouac, 2000; Kirouac & Hess, 1999). For example, the ex-
pectation (at least in Western cultures) is that females will 
tend to be more facially expressive, express fear and sad-
ness more readily, and smile more frequently than males, 
whereas males will tend to express anger more readily 
than females (Brody & Hall, 2000; Kring & Gordon, 
1998; LaFrance, Hecht, & Paluck, 2003). Our suggestion 
is that the human brain’s expression-processing systems 
are sensitive to such expectations insofar as they can draw 
upon information regarding the sex and identity of the 
person displaying the emotion.
According to Schweinberger and Soukup (1998) and 
Schweinberger et al. (1999), interactions at a perceptual 
level of processing are the presumed cause of asymmet-
ric Garner interference in face processing. Similarly, Le 
Gal and Bruce (2002; see especially p. 242) assumed that 
it is the absence of interactions at a perceptual level of 
processing that explains their finding of no Garner inter-
ference between expression classification and sex classi-
fication. We have indicated how our conception of Haxby 
et al.’s (2000) model of face processing is consistent with 
such an interpretation, insofar as it suggests that such an 
interaction occurs between neurologically separate sys-
tems that represent the changeable properties of faces on 
one hand, and the relatively invariant ones on the other. 
Shortly, we will elucidate how this model is nevertheless 
closer in spirit and detail to models of face processing 
that posit parallel and independent processes than it is to 
paradigmatic “parallel-contingent” models.
The possibility of interaction at an even later stage of 
processing is suggested by the results of our third experi-
ment, in which we used a facial variant of the Simon para-
digm. Given the similarity of the Simon and Stroop para-
digms, theoretical accounts of Stroop interference clearly 
have the potential to explain findings of interference on 
facial variants of the Simon paradigm. A common aspect 
of theoretical accounts of Stroop interference is an appeal 
to response competition: The extent to which process-
ing of the task-irrelevant dimension and that of the task-
relevant dimensions compete for control of the partici-
pant’s response depends on the degree of relatedness or 
overlap between the required response and the stimulus 
dimensions (see, e.g., Kornblum & Lee, 1995; MacLeod, 
1991). Thus, the interference effect observed in Experi-
ment 3 suggests that the locus of this Simon interference 
is at a response-selection stage of processing.
Given that the Simon paradigm employed in Experi-
ment 3 yielded the same asymmetric pattern of interfer-
ence as that observed with the Garner paradigm in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, the challenge is to find a model that can 
account parsimoniously for this finding of convergence. 
Although an explanation in terms of response conflict 
might be appropriate for findings of Simon interference, 
it is difficult to see how Garner interference effects could 
be due to response conflicts, given that in that paradigm 
the irrelevant dimension is not mapped onto the same re-
sponses as is the relevant dimension. We note, though, 
that it is possible that an interaction between two or more 
stimulus dimensions can occur at a response-selection 
stage of processing for reasons other than response conflict. 
For example, the interested reader might want to consider 
Nosofsky and Palmeri’s (1997a, 1997b) “exemplar-based 
random walk model” of stimulus categorization, which ac-
counts for Garner interference effects in terms of post-
perceptual operations at a memory-retrieval or response-
selection stage of processing, and how this model might 
be extended to account for the asymmetric pattern of in-
terference on facial variants of the Garner paradigm.
We have been promoting the utility of Haxby et al.’s 
(2000) model of face processing, our interpretation of 
which is consistent with the findings of asymmetric Gar-
ner interference between the processing of a face’s sex 
and identity on the one hand, and the processing of facial 
emotion and speech expressions on the other. This model 
locates the source of that interaction at a perceptual stage 
of processing. To the extent that Simon interference indi-
cates interaction at a later, response-selection stage of pro-
cessing, Haxby et al.’s model would need to be extended 
in order to account for our finding of such an effect. Be 
that as it may, our finding of the same pattern of asym-
metric interference in both our Garner and our Simon 
experiments indicates the pervasiveness of the principle 
that invariant dimensions of a stimulus are more useful 
referents for computing information about changeable as-
pects of that stimulus than vice versa. Moreover, Haxby 
et al.’s model preserves a high degree of functional sepa-
ration between anatomically distinct processing routes, 
with only a relatively small degree of dependence or con-
tingency, and then mostly in one direction and likely not 
mandatory. This model is a parallel-contingent model, but 
one that emphasizes the “parallel” much more than the 
“contingent.” It is thus closer in spirit and detail to mod-
els that posit parallel and independent processes, such as 
that of Bruce and Young (1986), than to the paradigms 
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of parallel-contingent models (see discussion and refer-
ences in Schweinberger et al., 1999, p. 1113). As such, 
Haxby et al.’s model is still consistent with a range of 
findings indicative of a high degree of functional separa-
tion (if not complete independence) between certain com-
ponents of face processing, which we mentioned in the 
introduction—namely, between those components that 
encode changeable properties of faces versus those that 
encode invariant ones. Consider, for example, neuropsy-
chological dissociations between identity and expression 
processing. Haxby et al.’s model is consistent with pre-
served expression processing despite impaired identity 
processing (due to damage to inferior but not to superior 
temporal cortex) and with preserved identity processing 
despite impaired expression processing (due to damage 
to superior but not to inferior temporal cortex). This is 
because there is relatively minimal functional reliance 
between the two anatomically separate components in the 
core system of Haxby et al.’s model, in comparison with 
the extent to which each of these components relies on 
the contributions of different components in the extended 
system. One intriguing prediction of this interpretation, 
given our aforementioned assumption about the direction 
of interaction between these components, is that those 
prosopagnosics who have preserved expression recogni-
tion abilities might be expected not to be able to use facial 
identity information (and perhaps not even information 
about the sex of faces) in their judgments of facial expres-
sion; such patients might not show the asymmetric pattern 
of interference in the facial variant of the Garner task, for 
example.
Conclusion
We have provided convergent evidence from two dif-
ferent interference paradigms that facial emotion clas-
sification can be significantly influenced by the sex of 
faces, but sex classification remains relatively impervi-
ous to facial emotion. These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that information about invariant aspects of 
faces is much more likely to influence the processing of 
changeable aspects of faces than information about their 
changeable aspects is to influence the processing of their 
invariant aspects. The findings of asymmetric interfer-
ence on facial variants of the Garner paradigm, including 
those reported here, suggest interactions at a perceptual 
level of processing, whereas our finding of asymmetric 
interference in the facial variant of the Simon paradigm 
suggests interaction at a memory-retrieval or response-
selection stage of processing. A challenge for face pro-
cessing models is therefore to show how the same asym-
metric pattern of interference could occur at different 
stages of processing or, alternatively, how interactions at 
a single stage of processing could account for the same 
asymmetric pattern of interference across two paradigms 
that place apparently rather different processing demands 
on the subject. Although Haxby et al.’s (2000) model does 
not obviously explain the Simon interference effect, a 
strong point of this model is that it can account for asym-
metric Garner interference while preserving a high degree 
of functional separation between the processing routes for 
invariant and for changeable aspects of faces. Future re-
search could capitalize on the ability of electrophysiologi-
cal recordings to determine not just the relative timing of 
different perceptual judgments about faces (Münte et al., 
1998), but also their interactions (Rahman, Sommer, & 
Schweinberger, 2002), to address the issue of the locus of 
interference in the different paradigms.
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